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An explosion and ﬁre occurred at a reﬁnery site leading to the evacuation of the site and to millions of pounds worth of
damage to the facility. A laboratory investigation was carried out to establish the immediate cause and any underlying
factors that may have contributed to the incident.
Failure of a section of insulated process pipework had occurred part way up a process column, Fig. 1. The pipe had failed
on an approximately horizontal section, close to the bottom dead centre, Fig. 2a and b. Close to the failure, a walkway support
bracket had been installed, Fig. 2c, in a position that suggested that interference between the bracket and the lagging/
cladding system had occurred. The relative position of the bracket and the failure are shown in Fig. 2c and d.
A section of the process pipework was recovered for detailed analysis in the laboratory.
2. Examination
2.1. Visual examination
The pipe section recovered from the reﬁnery was nominally 210 mm internal diameter and consisted of a straight section,
some 1430 mm in length, together with two right-angle elbows.
The elbows had been circumferentially welded to the straight section of pipe. In the as-received condition, the majority of
the pipe was coated with a ﬁbrous lagging material over which a black adhesive tape had been wrapped to stabilise it during            
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Fig. 1. General image of process column and site of failure (indicated in red). (For interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is
referred to the web version of the article.)
Fig. 2. (a) Position of failure of process pipework, (b) detail of pipework fracture, (c) walkway bracket interaction with pipework lagging, (d) pipework
bracket and failure (indicated).
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exposed. The failure, shown in Fig. 2b, consisted of a longitudinal hole, approximately 180 mm in length and, at its widest
opening, 60 mm in width in the circumferential direction.
The cladding, which would have formed the outer, weatherproof barrier, was thought to have been manufactured from an
aluminium alloy, although none was present on the section delivered to the laboratory.
The cut end remote from the failure was labelled A and, nearest the failure, B. The wall thickness was measured at 908
intervals around the circumference at both ends using a calibrated micrometre. The mean values were 8.4 mm at end A and
8.7 mm at end B. Dimensionally, the pipe was consistent with American Petroleum Institute (API) schedule 40 pipe. The
internal surface of the pipe appeared to have a dark, adherent oxide layer but was otherwise free of corrosion.Fig. 3. (a) Section of pipework with lagging partially removed, (b) cut out in insulation material at position of bracket, (c and d) composite image of pipework
with lagging removed, showing surface corrosion.
Table 1
Chemical analysis (mass%).
C Si Mn P S Cr Mo Ni
Sample 04477 0.21 0.29 0.84 0.010 0.009 0.17 0.06 0.07
Tolerance 0.007 0.007 0.03 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.009
ASTM 106/A Grade B 0.30 max 0.10 min 0.29–1.06 0.035 max 0.035 max 0.04 max 0.15 max 0.40 max
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which (a brown layer and a grey layer) were visible. The coating over most of the exposed surface was largely intact and there
was little evidence of corrosion, Fig. 3a.
The insulation had the appearance of mineral or glass ﬁbre and, where exposed, had a thickness of approximately 40–
50 mm. Removal of the adhesive tape exposed the surface of the lagging and showed that it had been applied in segments.
The ﬁrst section of lagging, from end A, had apparently been cut on site and had a length of approximately 350 mm. The
next section, which overlapped the fracture, had a total length of approximately 430 mm, however, approximately 250 mm
from one end, a cut-out approximately 80 mm in width had been made in the insulation and the surface of the pipe was
visible at this position, Fig. 3b, and this was coincident with the position at which a walkway support bracket had passed
close to the pipe, Fig. 2c. There was no evidence of grout, mastic or sealing compound that may have been applied to affect a
weatherproof seal around the area where the bracket penetrated the pipe lagging. Around the elbow, closest to end B, six
segments of cladding had been applied, Fig. 3a. A number of wires, approximately 1.0 mm in diameter, and steel banding
(12.7 mm wide, 0.85 mm thick) secured the lagging. The wires and banding were metallic and non-magnetic and were
therefore probably stainless steel.
Failure had occurred approximately at the bottom dead centre of the pipe, Fig. 2b, close to and below the position of the
walkway bracket. The external surface of the pipe was heavily corroded in the area surrounding the fracture, Figs. 3c and d,
and the corrosion extended approximately 1 m longitudinally and around one quarter of the circumference, centred around
the bottom dead centre of the pipe. The lagging was degraded around this area and large volumes of friable, loose corrosion
product were evident.
The remaining substrate material around the failure had a thickness of approximately 1 mm. Visually, there was little
evidence of a fresh metallic fracture surface.
A sample of lagging/cladding recovered from the plant in an area unaffected by the incident was assessed. The lagging
material had a thickness of approximately 50 mm. The cladding had the appearance of an aluminium alloy with a thickness
of approximately 0.75 mm.
2.2. Chemical analysis
Chemical analysis of the parent pipe material was carried out using an optical emission spectroscopy (OES) technique.
The results are shown in Table 1.
The chemical analysis was consistent with the requirements of ASTM A106/A Grade B [1].
Qualitative analysis of a sample of the cladding material was carried out using the energy dispersive analysis of X-rays
(EDX) facility on a scanning electron microscope (SEM). This showed that the material was an aluminium alloy containing
approximately 1% manganese, consistent with a 3000 series alloy. The banding and wire material were similarly analysed
and both were consistent with a type 304 stainless steel.
2.3. Hardness tests
Hardness tests were carried out on a sample of the pipe material in accordance with BS EN ISO 6507-1:1998 ‘‘Metallic
materials – Vickers hardness test’’. The results, with an accuracy of 3% gave a mean hardness of 152HV10 with a standard
deviation of 3.
2.4. Tensile tests
Three standard tensile tests were carried out in accordance with BS EN 10002-1 ‘‘Metallic materials testing – method
of test at ambient temperature’’ on parent material in the longitudinal direction. The results gave a mean 0.2% proof stress
of 300 MPa and a tensile strength of 516 MPa. The tensile requirements for Grade B in ASTM A106/A are minimum yield
strength of 240 MPa and a minimum tensile strength of 415 MPa, therefore, the material was compliant with the
Standard.
2.5. Corrosion measurements and analysis
The pipe was sectioned to allow thickness measurements to be made in the corroded area and the internal surface was
marked with a 50 mm grid pattern. The external surface of the pipe in the corroded region was too rough to allow ultrasonic
Fig. 4. (a) Thickness proﬁle of corroded area, approximate position of failure indicated, (b) microstructure of parent material.
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deep-throated micrometre once the majority of the loose corrosion product had been removed.
The results showed that the corroded area was approximately 1.1 m long in the pipe longitudinal direction and had a
maximum width in the circumferential direction, at the position of the failure, of 280 mm. The thickness proﬁle data is
shown in Fig. 4a (the red line indicating the longitudinal extent of the failure). Based on the area and loss of wall thickness,
the amount of material lost from the surface was estimated to be approximately 3 kg. The area immediately adjacent to the
failure had a mean thickness of approximately 1 mm and a range of 1.5–0.5 mm.
2.5.1. Analysis of corrosion products
Samples of the corrosion deposit, from a number of areas, were taken for EDX analysis in the SEM. The results showed that
the primary constituents were iron and oxygen together with signiﬁcant quantities of sodium, chlorine and sulphur. In
addition, other elements were also present in minor quantities. Analysis of the insulation material showed that it consisted
Fig. 5. (a) Section through pipe surface coating, (b) section through matrix material close to fracture surface, (c) micro-section through fracture surface.
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consistent with a calcium silicate based mineral wool.
2.6. Metallography
A longitudinal microsection taken from the parent material was polished to a 1 mm ﬁnish and etched in a 2% nitric acid
solution. This showed a structure of ferrite and pearlite, Fig. 4b, consistent with a carbon content of approximately 0.2%.
Some directionality of the microstructure indicated that the pipe had been hot formed. The microstructure was consistent
with chemical analysis and mechanical properties data.
A longitudinal section taken through the coating system, Fig. 5a, showed that the coating had been made up of two paint
layers. The lower layer, adjacent to the metal surface, had a thickness of approximately 75 mm and the upper layer a
thickness of approximately 35 mm. EDX analysis of the coating system showed that the lower layer had a high zinc content
together with smaller components of other elements and the upper layer had a high oxygen, silicon and titanium content
with smaller components of other elements.
A circumferential section was taken through the failure, Fig. 5b, and this showed that considerable thinning had occurred
in the area around the failure. The microstructure at the point of failure, Fig. 5c, did not show any evidence of plastic
deformation which would have been consistent with the ligament of remaining material stretching during ﬁnal failure,
however, it was apparent that the fracture surface had been corroded following failure and this evidence may well have been
lost. The thickness of the remaining material close to the failure was approximately 0.5 mm.
W. Geary / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 1 (2013) 249–256 2553. Discussion
3.1. Pipe material
The pipe had been manufactured from a carbon–manganese steel whose properties, in terms of chemical analysis and
tensile data, were compliant with the requirements of ASTM A106/A Grade B. Dimensionally the pipe was consistent with
API schedule 40. The pipe, when new, had been ﬁt for purpose and there was no evidence that inadequacies of the material
contributed to failure.
3.2. Coatings
The pipe coating system documentation showed that the speciﬁed primer was a solvent based inorganic zinc material
with a thickness of 65 mm and the speciﬁed top coat a silicone acrylic material with a thickness of 25 mm.
The EDX analysis showed that the coating was consistent with the speciﬁcation and the thickness of the layers was
slightly in excess of the speciﬁcation. The coating remote from the failure was generally in good condition and there was no
evidence to suggest that premature failure of the coating system contributed to the incident.
3.3. Insulation
The pipe insulation system documentation speciﬁed that the insulation could be manufactured from a range of materials
including mineral wool pre-cut and pre-formed pipe covering. Chemical analysis of the lagging material on the failed pipe
was consistent with this.
In addition, the dimensions and the materials for the wires and banding securing the insulation were also speciﬁed. The
wires were speciﬁed as being 1.2 mm diameter stainless steel. Analysis showed that the material was a 304 grade stainless
steel but that the wires had a diameter of 1.0 mm, somewhat smaller than speciﬁed. The banding was speciﬁed as
13 mm  0.4 mm stainless steel. Analysis showed that it was consistent with a 304 grade stainless steel with dimensions
12.7 mm  0.85 mm. There was no evidence that either the wires or the banding had degraded or that the variation in
dimensions from those speciﬁed had any impact on the incident. The cladding material was also speciﬁed as 3000 or 5000
series aluminium alloy and, again, EDX analysis showed that it was compliant with the speciﬁcation.
3.4. Corrosion under insulation (CUI)
It was apparent that the position of the walkway bracket and the insulated pipe resulted in some interference between
the two systems. This had apparently been resolved by cutting out a section of the cladding and insulation to allow the
bracket to be accommodated. It is not known whether the area had subsequently been treated to effect a weather-proof joint,
however, there was no evidence of grout, mastic, sealant or other materials that would suggest that the area was suitably
treated. However, it is possible that such materials had been consumed during the ﬁre following the incident.
The proximity between insulated pipe systems and other equipment is addressed by a relevant Foster Wheeler
Engineering Standard number 4210/29-82A1 (1992), ‘‘Hot service insulation for piping and equipment’’, and states that: ‘‘A
minimum clearance of 25 mm between the outside surface of any insulation ﬁnish and adjacent equipment, pipe or
structural members shall be maintained’’. In addition, a more recent BP document ‘‘Corrosion under insulation – A guide to
prevention and detection of corrosion beneath thermal insulation’’ (No S/UTG/309/01, 2001), stated that: ‘‘the distance
between any insulated pipe and adjacent structural steelwork, uninsulated pipe, etc., should be no less than twice the
insulation design thickness on the former pipe to prevent awkward insulation geometry which permits water ingress’’. The
evidence showed that the installation was not compliant with either of these recommendations.
The evidence of the corrosion and its proximity to the cut away in the lagging strongly suggested that water entered the
insulation system through the breach in the weather prooﬁng jacketing. The water had probably migrated through the
lagging and along the interface between the lagging and the pipe and formed a pool at the lowest point. The source of the
water is likely to have been rain and, given the proximity of the plant to the coast, is likely to have contained some sodium
chloride together with other industrial pollutants. Chemical analysis of the corrosion deposits showed evidence of chlorine,
sodium and other components, however, it is possible that some of these may have resulted from contamination due to post-
incident ﬁre ﬁghting activities.
The plant was approximately 13 years old and had been operated at a temperature of approximately 90 8C. Corrosion of an
8 mm thick pipe to 0.5 mm thick, over 13 years would require an average corrosion rate of 0.6 mm per year. Although
uncertainties exist regarding the exact nature of the corrodant, temperature, wet dry cycles, etc. and therefore the rate at
which corrosion would progress and, assuming that the paint coating on the pipe provided complete protection for 5 years
[2], a corrosion rate of 0.9 mm per year would be required.
Temperature effects on corrosion rates are addressed in NACE Standard Recommended Practice (RP0198-2004) ‘‘The
control of corrosion under thermal insulation and ﬁreprooﬁng materials – A systems approach’’. Fig. 1 of this document
shows the relationship between corrosion rates and temperature; the data indicates that at temperatures close to 100 8C,
corrosion rates may exceed 0.75 mm per year.
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temperature band. While penetration rates of the order of 1.5 mm per year are fairly typical where such conditions exist,
there have been isolated reports of penetration rates of more than 3 mm per year’’.
These documents clearly showed that had the insulation been compromised at the time of installation, sufﬁcient time had
elapsed to allow corrosion penetration of the pipe.
The residual thickness of the pipe, measured around the fracture surface was approximately 0.5 mm. This indicates that
the pipe had failed under the inﬂuence of the internal pressure once the thickness had been reduced to a critical level.
Fracture had progressed longitudinally until the running crack had encountered thicker material and the stress intensity was
reduced to a sub-critical level and the crack was arrested.
The root cause of this incident was ﬁrstly, a management failure to adequately assess the suitability of the installation
design, with respect to the proximity of the walkway bracket to the pipework. Secondly, a failure to ensure that the
implemented installation was adequately weatherproofed and thirdly, the lack of an adequate in-service inspection regime
that might have identiﬁed degradation of the pipe prior to failure. This, and other related incidents have contributed to a
major hazard industry-wide debate and increased regulator focus on lagged pipework and CUI issues.
4. Conclusions1. The material of construction of the pipe was consistent with codes and standards and ﬁt for purpose.
2. The pipe coating system appeared to be compliant with speciﬁcations; there was no evidence to suggest that an
inadequacy of the coating contributed to failure.
3. The lagging system appeared to be ﬁt for purpose, there was no evidence that inadequacy of the intended system
contributed to failure.
4. Failure of the pipe had occurred as a result of corrosion under insulation (CUI), the rate of corrosion was entirely consistent
with published data. The wall thickness of the pipe had been reduced to a level that would not support the internal
pressure; the remaining ligament had then failed as a result of a ductile overload.5. The proximity of the pipe to the walkway bracket was not in compliance with published guidance.
6. Water had entered the lagging system through a breach in the jacketing/lagging made to accommodate a walkway
support bracket. It is probable that no adequate precautions were taken to weather-proof the penetration into the lagging
system.7. The investigation has focussed both industry and regulator attention on the speciﬁc issues associated with lagged
pipework and CUI.
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